Final Report*

Modes of Adaptation in the Quest for Peace in a Terror Prone Land:

The Case of Northwestern Mindanao in the Southern Philippines

by

Timothy Austin

Department of Criminology

Indiana University of Pennsylvania

Indiana, PA

August, 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

This report provides findings and commentary resulting from a small research grant from the International Peace Research Association Foundation (IPRAF) that allowed on-site field research in the Southern Philippines in 2013—2014.

Although the report conveys results of research conducted in the summer of 2013, the study selectively incorporates outcomes of over a dozen field trips completed by the principal investigator to the island of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines beginning in 1980. Stated differently, it is difficult to take a snapshot of what is happening in one small province in Mindanao in 2013 and make any sense of what is going on without looking to its socio-cultural past. With this in mind, in order to begin a discussion of Muslim-Christian conflict in Mindanao, it is instructive to begin at the beginning of such ethnic conflict between these two populations that originated almost five centuries ago in the Southern Philippines.

In the year 1521 A.C.E, Ferdinand Magellan, with five ships and a combined crew of 270, set sail to seek the Spice Islands of the South Pacific and to circumnavigate the world. The ships dropped anchor off the small isle of Mactan about 150 miles north of Mindanao in what is now the southern Philippines and where this present research project was carried out. Magellan and his crew, also intent on amassing land holdings for Spain and converting native peoples to Catholicism, encountered locals who had already accepted Islamic beliefs and customs a hundred years earlier. Although Magellan planted a flag claiming the entire thousand mile archipelago of over 7,000 islands for Spain, the conquest was not quick or easy. During the ensuing battle, Magellan was killed by Lapu-Lapu, an Islamic chief, thus beginning struggles in the Philippines between Muslims and Christians that continued over the centuries. The Spanish eventually overcame the natives and, throughout the nearly 400 years of Spanish rule and Catholic

traditions, the conflict became less about religion and more about political domination and control over territory. The struggle has been limited almost entirely to the large southern Philippine island of Mindanao.

The Spanish occupation of the Philippines came to an end with an American victory in the brief Spanish-American War of 1898. As part of the spoils of war, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States that began nearly a half-century of occupation by the Americans. In fact, however, Philippine revolutionary forces declared 1898 as their own independence at the end of the Spanish-American War only to lose hard-fought but short-lived battles with the Americans that forced Filipinos into subservience for another five decades. The nearly half-century of American occupation was interrupted by four years of domination by the Japanese until the end of World War II when the Republic of the Philippines finally gained official recognition in 1946 as an independent nation.

Contrary to much popular opinion, over the centuries of foreign occupation, relationships between Muslim and Christian inhabitants of Mindanao were often peaceful although beset with periodic uprisings extending to the present day (See: Terrorists Organizations in the Philippines, 2013; cf. Terrorism in the Philippines, 2013).

SETTING

The major portion of the field work for this study took place in the province of Lanao del Norte situated on the northwest coast of the island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines. Iligan City, a seaport and the only urban area of the province, is surrounded by numerous small towns and villages. The city teems with activity with farmers arriving daily to sell their wares in the many open markets. Merchant and passenger ships dock at odd hours of the day and night.

The city population reflects a mix of about 35% Muslim and about 62% Christian (Catholic) citizens. The two groups are mostly peaceful but with intermittent periods of conflict creating a mood of unease for locals and outsiders (See, for example, Santos, 2010). The research setting represents a struggling economy with an annual per capita income equivalent to about 1,000 U.S. dollars for villagers outside Iligan city (Quickstat, 2014). A local university (Mindanao State University) provided a base for the principal investigator. Several villages within easy access from the university, and with mixed Christian-Muslim population, were targeted for research.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This project responds to four categories of research questions.

1. *Why should the research setting be characterized as a terror-prone area?* In other words, can traditional crimes be separated from acts of terrorism? Specifically, what are various styles of crimes and illegal behaviors that tend to arise in the research area? For instance, what is the nature of street crime, kidnapping, and land-squatting, and how are such social problems inflamed because of the civil unrest in the research setting?

2. *What is the relationship between geographic and social-structural features of the Philippines (and the research setting specifically) that predictably link with societal challenges or dysfunctions, including terrorism*? Of particular interest is how geographic, demographic, ethnic, and societal features may generate, or link to, social problems, and specifically to terrorism.

3. *What is it like to live in what is perceived as a terror-prone area, and in what specific ways does terrorism impact on local citizenry*?

4. *How have local citizens found ways to cope with life in the conflict-ridden research setting*? What styles or modes of adaptation have emerged in this troubled region?

METHODOLOGY

Data Collection and Sampling:

The research design follows a traditional ethnographic approach that combines daily observations of small-town life with semi-structured and open-ended interviews with locals. Interviews were conducted with educators, lawyers, retired government workers, physicians, merchants, students, and local farmers. A few respondents represent persons with whom the investigator has developed rapport on previous visits to the area. The Iligan Institute of Technology, a branch campus of Mindanao State University located in Iligan City and where the researcher has developed an affiliation, has always been extremely cordial in providing assistance.

Approximately thirty in-depth interviews were conducted. With the initial assistance of educators at the local university, the investigator followed a snow-ball or network sampling procedure (Berg, 1989). Beginning with one individual or small group of locals known to the researcher or suggested by the local university, interviewees were asked to recommend another, or others, who might be knowledgeable and willing to take part in the research. It is common in the research setting to discuss local customs in informal, small groups so that a comment of one villager might jog another's memory or stimulate another to respond to a general idea presented by the researcher. In these cases, the field work incorporated a style common to focus groups (see, for example, Morgan, 1993).

The research combines individual interviews with about six focus groups. Interviews extended from a minimum of one hour to many hours into the evening and sometimes discussions were held on multiple occasions with particularly informative respondents. This

style of data collection was carried out until a point of redundancy was reached whereby little or no new information was forthcoming. Thus, the number of total interview participants is a close approximation. The field work was conducted over a five-week period in the summer of 2013.

Importantly, conversations were also held with Filipinos residing outside the main research setting, particularly in Cebu and the capital of manila. This allowed insight of how persons outside Mindanao perceived of Muslim-Christian conflict.

A second data collection source pertained to local archives that are easily accessed only at the Philippine research site. This includes local government documents (police and provincial records in the public domain) as well as local newspapers (sometimes published weekly) which carry reports and other community commentary and minutiae.   A few very local newspapers represent neighborhood based "gossip sheets" that can nonetheless be quite relevant to the research questions in generating discussions with interviewees—particularly regarding behind-the-scenes frustrations of everyday life in the village or town.

Finally, direct observation rounded out the data collection and formed an integral element of the field research. Comprehensive field notes were diligently maintained on a strict daily basis. Institutional Review Board requirements were always carefully observed.

 Analysis Plan:

Following ethnographic strategies, this study incorporated heavy descriptive accounts as set forth by interview respondents. The discussions with locals, combined with archival and observational data, resulted in case-studies of routine daily life in the research setting. In addition to personal accounts, the descriptive data was subjected to rigorous textual analysis for thematic content. Key words and phrases were flagged and sorted in regards to how they reflected linkages to the research questions. The themes were categorized and organized to reflect how

local citizens perceived of terrorism in the area and how they adapted to such conflict in diverse ways (See, for instance, Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland, 2006). Conceptual models are developed that form the basis for sharper understanding of the region and set the stage for even more refined research.

FINDINGS

In this section of the report, the research findings emerging from the field work are set forth as they answer, or respond to, the four research questions.

Response to research question 1. ***Why should the research setting be characterized as a terror-prone area?***

It is appropriate to ask if we are we talking about crime, terrorism, or warfare, or all three activities simultaneously. Over the past decades, some have referred to the intermittent uprisings of conflict between Muslims and Christians in Mindanao as "low-intensive warfare", because the conflicts have been erupting sporadically for many decades and involve ineffective efforts of police and military to bring uprisings to a complete stop (Klare and Kornbluh, 1988, Shultz, 1991). Without question, it is true that the Philippine government has intervened for many decades with all branches of the military in efforts to eliminate Muslim/Christian conflict. A primary reason stated for the declaration of martial law between 1972 and 1986 by then president Ferdinand Marcos was the on-going turmoil in Mindanao. Over the past several decades, the United States has provided military assistance to the southern Philippines in the wide-ranging effort to thwart what is referred to as terrorist based operations (Malakunas, 2012).

Terrorism has become a buzz word in the social science literature, as well as in the major news outlets around the world. This has been prompted, in part, by the paramount event of the world trade center bombings on September 11, 2001 that stimulated heightened alert and concern

about terror, both from within and without a nation's borders. Yet, terrorist acts can be seen as overlapping with, if not identical with, traditional crimes of violence and property destruction. What blurs the issue is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the three activities of crime, warfare, and terrorism. All three can involve destruction of property, interpersonal violence, and a wide-variety of thievery, and such law-breaking can victimize seemingly innocent and unknowing citizens.

However, it is possible to be more specific about when an activity is related to terrorism. Although terrorism has been interpreted in numerous ways over the past several decades (See, for example, Greisman, 1977; Simmons and Mitch, 1985; Turk, 1982; and Walter, 1964), the analysis by Gibbs (1989) seems most suited (though not perfect) in clarifying terrorism as it appears in the Philippines. That is, terrorism pertains to "Illegal interpersonal violence, including threatened violence, associated with political (or political-religious) extremism and subversion." Furthermore, an essential goal of terrorist activity (and one observed in the Philippine scenario) is that terrorism would be designed to alter some aspect of the prevailing socio-cultural order by incorporating secretive, furtive, or clandestine methods. Even with these rather elaborate characterizations, we can still see overlap between warfare, terrorism, and simply normal criminal activity.

We can say with some confidence that from a strictly observational viewpoint, there seems little difference in the three activities. That is, destruction is destruction and killing is killing. How does one really know the definitive motivations of the offenders? When might violence or thievery have political undertones? When does a violent act become subversion? What is subversion? As will be suggested in this report, so much of what is happening in the

southern Philippines is a matter of perception. Perhaps stated differently, one hears what one wants to hear.

Another obvious pattern, and one observed in the research area, is that an offender could engage in violent activity for purposes of personal or family revenge (i.e., murder, or bombing in a public setting) and release a report that the act was motivated by terrorism. Such would fan-the-fire of fear among the citizenry and only work to heighten anxiety about terrorism.

Suffice it to say, most would agree that we are talking about a concept (terrorism) that must be viewed as an abstraction. The perceptions of locals are skewed. For instance, on a personal note, I spend some of my visits to the Philippines in Manila, far from the southern island of Mindanao. I am invariably asked "what brought you to the Philippines"? When I answer that I was spending time in Mindanao, the response is always the same. "Aren't you afraid," my various interlocutors would ask? "After all, there is such violence down there! You might be kidnapped or met with other kinds of brutality". Most often, such comments are clearly made by Filipinos who live out their lives on the northern island of Luzon, and who usually admit to having never visited Mindanao.[1]

Several structural issues at the societal level tend to confound the problem of trying to answer the question are we talking about low-intensive warfare, terrorism, or crime. The second research question addresses this issue, even if indirectly.

Response to Research Question 2: ***What is the relationship between social-structural features of the Philippines that predictably link with societal challenges or dysfunctions, including terrorism?***

Table 1 outlines the relationship between physical/social structures and potential dysfunctions at both national and regional levels. Each relationship is discussed in further detail.

Table 1. Relationship between Philippine Physical/Social Structures and Potential Dysfunctions
at National and Regional Levels*

Structure	Scope	Potential Dysfunctions
Geography	**Nation**: 7107 islands; total land mass similar to Arizona. **Mindanao**: 10 islands; total land mass slightly less than Ohio **Province**: Lanao del Norte; land mass slightly smaller than Rhode Island.	Social isolationism; allegiances to local island or province
Population	National population about 103 Million; 22 million in Mindanao, and 608,000 in Lanao del Norte.	Over-population given available resources
Mobility (Physical)		Inter-island water transportation slow and difficult.. Land travel in Lanao del Norte by bus or automobile (40% with poor access to roads). Thirty- five percent reports displacement from homes due to extremist groups. Ten percent of population work overseas.
Mobility (Social)	Lanao del Norte	One-third report little or no knowledge of official provincial activities.
Family	Lanao del Norte	Average family size of 5 members exhibit extreme familial piety.
Economy	Lanao del Norte	High under-employment levels with poor access to health care; 50% own TV or radio & 50% rent; 29% of dwellings with thatched roof).
Education	Lanao del Norte	Widely available, but not compulsory (50% have elementary school only).
Polity	Lanao del Norte	Social control localized with distrust of higher government (80% place more trust in local barangay).
Religion	Lanao del Norte	75% Catholic, 21% Muslim. Popular acceptance of native mysticism, amulets, good & bad spirits.

Geography & Population Influence:

Although sometimes overlooked, an understanding of the social dysfunctions of the research setting must begin at the national level. The Republic of the Philippines is comprised of over 7,000 islands spread over 1,000 miles north to south in the South China Sea. From the north, only a few hundred miles south of Taiwan, the islands extend southward almost touching Borneo. What is less emphasized is that the 500 or so disconnected islands that have, as far as is known, human habitation, act to isolate much of the population into fragmented and in some ways disadvantaged communities. It is true that an isolated island may be viewed in a positive light, with the expected quaintness and community cohesion associated with small town life (Sorokin, P., Zimmerman, C. and Galpin, C. 1930; Smith, T. L., 1970). However, the problem of being cut-off from the national system of government means that such secluded islands are sometimes left to fend for themselves and reap fewer benefits from the distant government centers in Manila. Simply put, it can be more dangerous to reside on a secluded island. Also, if a specific social institution (i.e., family, education, economy, or polity, etc.) is deficient in some way in the more distant islands, assistance from the revenue holding, national government can problematic. Out of sight, out of mind takes on additional clarity in such fractured regions. Not surprisingly, to the extent that national tax revenues may provide a needed jump-start, those distant atolls can be more easily overlooked.

This means that of the 100 plus million people of the Philippine islands, many are cut off from major urban areas and seats of government. Furthermore, about half of the total population of the nation still resides in rural regions (i.e. rural barrios or *barangays*).[2] A region can be an isolated island, as well as, rural. This works to compound the problem of being removed from the advantages of urban centers. The Mindanao region (i.e., actually 10 islands with a land-mass

about the size of Ohio), holds a population of about 22 million with its inhabitants far removed from the seat of government in Manila.

Physical & Social Mobility Influence

A bulk of the population lacks resources for inter-island travel that is limited to ocean vessel or air travel. Many, if not most, live out their lives in a relative state of seclusion, basically remaining unaware of what is going on nationally, and even less informed on the international front.   In Mindanao, and without question in the research area of Lanao del Norte, a lack of trouble-free transportation and communication (i.e., poor roads and near daily brownouts) limit access to resources (i.e., including protection in the form of police or military support). As shown in Table 1, inter-island water transportation is slow and expensive for many. Land travel in the province of Lanao del Norte is primarily by bus or automobile, otherwise by motorized tricycle, bicycle pedaling, or on foot. Forty percent of the residents of the research setting report poor access to roads (Table 1). The lack of physical mobility is followed by diminished concern with what is going on even at the provincial level. Table 1 reflects that a full third of the over half million inhabitants of the research setting report no knowledge official activities (i.e., local government) of the province.

Over the past few decades, multiple researchers have pointed out how rural populations manage disputes and legal infractions at the most local barrio or barangay level (Austin, 1999; Machado, K. 1979, Silliman, G. S. 1985). This seems to function quite smoothly during times of relative tranquility. Yet, when disasters occur, natural or otherwise (i.e., armed insurgency), government resources may be out of reach. Local populations cannot rely on distant official mechanisms of control. In Lanao del Norte, with its single city of Iligan, police or military cannot be quickly summoned to the half of the province population residing in small towns and

rural region. Even when communication is effective, police and even military may be hampered by near impassible terrain—particularly in rainy season.

The 2010 survey reflected in Table 1 found that 35% of the more than 600,000 residents of the province have experienced some displacement from their homes do to extremists groups. My own field work suggests that much of this displacement is likely due to "fear of impending terrorist activity" rather than being directly attacked and forced to relocate because of personal violence or property damage. And, at any rate, for most citizens, lack of funding would disallow movement outside the province. Social mobility can also be seen in the movement of persons in search for employment. It is not surprising that many youth seek ways out of the province for what is perceived as better employment opportunities in the urban sprawl of Manila, a region estimated at more than twenty million (Quickstat, 2014). However, the assets of city life are themselves diminishing as the burgeoning population outgrows available resources. Table 1 also reports that about 10% of the population of Lanao del Norte have found jobs outside the country as "overseas contract workers."

As I travel in the more remote regions of the province, I am struck by how locals are disinterested in, or simply unaware of, what is going on in the nation's capital of Manila. Those living in far removed regions (or islands) rarely purchase newspapers published in the capital city, and it becomes apparent the local news carriers seek out the professionals and tourists. The masses are content to remain oblivious to the goings-on in the faraway national capital. Locals remain concerned with what is going on in their immediate surrounding (at the *barangay* or *purok* levels)* and not much even with that. Only half the population report owning a television or radio (see Table 1).

Education and Economy Influence

The province is about the size Rhode Island and with a population a little less than a million. The average annual income in the rural area of Lanao del Norte and outside Iligan city is reported to be the equivalent to about $1,000 U.S. dollars (Quickstat, 2008, cf. 2014).   A class-structure clearly exists but weighted more toward the two extremes of rich and poor. Streets of Iligan City are filled with by-standers, many selling almost worthless trinkets for a few pesos, and others simply asking for a handout. It is only too obvious that the population has plainly outgrown the current resources. And, this is most clearly observed in the number of citizens without work, or unmistakably falling into the category of long-time underemployed.

One would think the connection between education and economy would be well-understood and accentuated. Seemingly common sense, the higher one's educational level, the greater the likelihood of competing for the better paying jobs. Unfortunately, there is no compulsory education in the Philippines. It was explained to me by a mother of six children that "it makes no sense to go to school. There are no jobs. One might as well go to the rice fields where there is some work." Moreover, the public school system is not really free. Uniforms are required of students, and even if cost is minimal, the incidental daily expenses are prohibitive to the poor. Many respondents will acknowledge that the ultimate goal for many is to escape the province for the hustle and bustle of the urban areas. If this does not work, the goal is to escape the nation entirely. Of course, this is unattainable without financial resources, but nonetheless on the minds of many respondents. Indeed, there appears to be no real equivalent to an "American Dream." Rather, it is replaced with a dream to flee the country entirely for what is perceived to be elsewhere lands of grand opportunity. In recent years, these include the United States, Canada, and the Persian Gulf nations, and basically any more developed country).

Religion

Much has been written about the development of religion in the Philippines (Camba, 2012; Che Man, W. K. 1990; Gowing, 1988). Just a few quick points need to be made here. First, the Republic of the Philippines is predominately Catholic (85%) and about 5% Muslim. The overwhelming Catholic majority results from more than 300 hundred years of Spanish occupation. The custom to be "fruitful and multiple" and with no mandate to use contraception has resulted in the overwhelming population explosion (i.e., today about the 11th most populous nation). The province of Lanao del Norte reports an average of five children per family (see Table 1). The Mindanao region also reflects a Catholic majority but with a lesser dominance than the country at large. Lanao del Norte reflects about 75% Catholic with a Muslim population of about 21%. As one travels southward on the island of Mindanao, the percent of Muslim citizenry increases. Islam entered Mindanao from Indonesia and did not gain strongholds in other regions of the Philippines as it did in the far southern regions. Thus, the situation is reversed in the extreme southern portion of Mindanao with Islamic dominance.

Second, although it is true that the two populations hold different religious principles, and embrace distinct customs of language, dress, eating habits, and legal doctrines, it does not really make total sense to talk specifically of "religious" conflict. The conflicts have been more about governmental control and disputes of economy. Stated differently, from a strictly religious or spiritual point of view, Muslims and Christians have tended to co-exist in relative harmony over the generations with the two groups living side-by-side with intermarriage.[3] Indirectly, of course, and from the very beginning of Spanish control, the Islamic groups remained incensed and frustrated that a people they viewed as infidels would wield substantial and continuous political and economic control.

The choice of who one chooses as a prophet (i.e., Muhammad or Jesus) is not so much the issue as the differences in several cultural customs. For instance, the comparative liberation of women, and the eating of pork by Christians remain prominent examples. And, even with these differences, what is publicized as "Muslim-Christian conflict" is, in fact, very much sporadic—the peaceful times far outweighing the times of bloodshed.

Another religious-based feature that must be noted in a discussion of the interplay of religion and terrorism is the long-standing belief in, and wearing of, amulets that are thought to offer protection from things defined as evil. There is less need to worry about any impending danger when you have protection. Wearing of the cross by the masses of Christians and quite often accompanied by the wearing of ancient amulets (*anting-anting*) to ward off evil-spirits is wide-spread in the research setting.

Another rather common-sense but important detail that needs repeated is that predictably only a small segment of Mindanao Muslim's are advocates or backers of political extremism or of a jihad point of view. This surprises few, but still needs to be reiterated.

Political Influence:
Social Control: The Formal and the Informal

As noted earlier, when the topic turns to security and social control it is clear that any benefits of national police or military are hard-pressed to guarantee services to outlying islands or to those rural regions far from urban areas. Even if a remote province contains a city population (as with this study's research setting), the likelihood that city-based police would be able to reach the isolated rural citizens is either unlikely or at best, authorities would be late in supplying any services. It is important to realize that even in 2014, about half the population of the Philippines, and in the research setting, still resides in a rural areas.

Although it cannot be fully developed here, several points need to be accentuated. Throughout the Philippines, social control always begins at the local, even neighborhood level. This is seen in the earliest emergence of the barangay (community-based) system of social organization. National government policies stipulate that criminal disputes begin at the community level with the barangay captain. Rural barangays have an average of about 900 residents and maintain a nationally accepted organizational structure. A leader, or captain, is elected who appoints a cadre of assistants to help manage local affairs. These affairs can pertain to education, sanitation, recreation, housing, security, as well as any issues of citizen grievances or disputes. As briefly mentioned, this has several benefits. Yet, it does allow the higher government, whether municipality, city, or national administration to leave management issues to barangay officials—at least in the first instance of a problem. All of the 81 provinces of the nation are sub-divided into approximately 42,000 barangays which includes both rural and urban areas. Consequently, even in the urban areas, a vast majority of problems and disputes are initially managed at the most local level.

A typical barangay captain in the research setting will appoint around ten trusted associates as members of a guard (i.e., *tanod*) that act as an informal security force for the community. The barangay holds meetings at the request of the captain, and these assemblies can take on the style a very informal hearing where, for example, differences between disputing parties can go through a resolution process (Silliman, 1991; cf. Austin, 1999). Members of the *tanod* security force do not wear uniforms and would not generally carry weapons. In the summer of 2013 a few *tanod* members were seen wearing baseball caps displaying the logo *tanod*. In the more urban communities, *tanod* members might be seen wearing identifying T-shirts, often yellow in color. From a social control perspective this barangay structure is quite

similar to the well-documented Japanese *koban* system of neighborhood policing (Time, 2013).

At the research setting, the chief of the barangay *tanod* would have access to firearms though not

carried on a regular basis. Other than the *tanod*, there is no other group at the neighborhood

level that would act in any kind of official capacity in regards to social control. Of course,

families member can, and do have a reputation for joining together to assist in squelching minor

disturbances. In such a context, local community control, which forms a substantial part of

Philippine social structure throughout the research setting, is little prepared for organized

political extremism in the form of violent terrorism.

Response to research question 3: ***What is it like to live in what is perceived as a terror-
prone area and in what specific ways does terrorism impact on local citizenry?***

A most appropriate way to describe local attitudes toward the sporadic terroristic activity

in the research setting is to introduce the perspective of natural disaster research. How citizenry

react to national disasters in a variety of global regions has been the subject of rather intense

social science research since the early 20th century (Bates, et al. 1963; Carr, 1932; Wallace,

1956; Stoddard, 1968; cf.: Rodriguez, Quarantelli, and Dynes, 2007). Furthermore, any of the

various natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, monsoons, volcanoes, flooding, and mud-slides, etc.)

can be used as a comparison with terrorism and, ironically, all of these natural disasters pertain

specifically to the Philippines. Drawing an analogy between national disasters and terrorism is

quite plausible for multiple reasons.

1. Most natural disasters and terrorist acts occur unexpectedly, and distress large

numbers of people. It is impossible to predict precisely when either will occur or what the

outcome might be.

2. Certainly, the initial impact of both styles of disasters can directly damage property and harm many people. Also, indirectly, both styles of calamities can instill fear in citizenry for an extended time. That is, living next to an intermittently active volcano or in an earthquake zone is not all that different from residing in a region noted for occasional terrorist extremism.

3. Although one can take some preventive precautions in an effort to counter the negative effects of such disasters (natural or human), there really is not much one can do to fully prevent either. If one is intent on placing a bomb in a public place, little can be done to offset such determination.

4. In the research setting, with such a heavy dominion of Catholic traditions, it is quite common for locals to resign themselves to spiritual responses and resolutions of any pending catastrophe. That is to say, it is ordinary in Lanao del Norte for locals to accept their fate, whatever it might be, as simply "God's will." This is not surprising when three-fourths of the citizens of the province are devout Catholic; vast majorities prominently wear the cross around their neck, and often with rosary beads in hand or nearby. Many taxi drivers can be seen with a miniature rosary wrapped around the vehicle gearshift. Buying a new house or car commonly means a visit by a priest to bless the home or vehicle, to keep residents safe from any danger. The idea of relying on godly protection is not new, as was vividly characterized by Karl Marx as an "opiate of the masses" (1844). Certainly one of the major functions of religion is to give believers a sense of security and inner-peace in the face of any impending peril. The point is that locals really do not appear to openly worry about either natural disasters or terrorism, and take a point of view that "if your number is up, it is up, and you cannot do anything about it." This rationalization appears to be at play with any natural disasters and also with terrorism.

Thus, it is in this context that we must consider the influence of terrorism over the local inhabitants of the research setting. Importantly, when we say that local residents do not openly show extreme apprehension about the ultimate impact (i.e., death and destruction) from disasters, natural or otherwise, it does not mean that such disasters do not affect the daily lives of citizenry. Indeed, locals do, in fact, feel the influence of both, and such distresses or disruptions can be observed at all levels—individual, group, and community. In other words, such disasters can certainly influence the way persons attempt to carry out their daily life routines, and the community at large may feel a sense of despondency, and/or anomie. Using a biblical scenario, it is entirely possible that one might not worry about their ultimate destiny after death (as in the parable of Noah, or in the examples of lives of New Testament disciples), but at the same time, realize how difficult earthly life can be on a daily basis, and not necessarily be happy about it. Consequently, terrorism (and other disasters) can, and do, impact the lives of locals in the research setting.

An appropriate way to describe and better understand the various ways that terrorism influences citizens, and how locals in turn respond, is to draw upon the rather time-tested strategy provided by "role theory" as heavily set forth in the sociological literature of the 1950s and 1960 (Biddle and Thomas, 1966; Bates and Harvey, 1976; Most human social activity can be seen as an interplay between individuals who occupy numerous functions (roles) each of which is governed by a set of norms as to how a particular task is to be played out. The social structure of individuals, groups, organizations, and communities can be seen as this rather intricate interaction matrix of these specialized functions or roles. It has been shown that one way to understand how a natural disaster impacts on people and a community is to examine how the social structure of roles is negatively impacted (Bates, 1982; Bates and Peacock, 1987).

Using the same strategy as a model, we can examine how locals in the research setting are influenced by residing in a terror-prone locale by exploring their role structure, and how terrorist activity or the fear of terrorism negatively affects how various functions are achieved or performed.

Figure 1 categorizes terrorism as a rather fixed or permanent fixture in the research setting that acts an independent variable. The independent variable of terrorism then in turn results in a variety of styles of role stress and social disorder that are depicted as dependent variables. At the individual level, one may conceptualized a variety of role-stresses. At the larger community level, the persistence of terrorism is predicted to generate social discord or closer to what is describe as being characteristic of an anomic society.

**Figure 1. The Impact of Terrorism on Behavior at Varied Levels with Resulting
     Stress Types**

Independent Stimulus	Scope	Intervening Features	Dependent Stress Types
	Individual	Culture Personality Interaction Situation	Role Conflict Role Incongruity Role Inadequacy Role Non-complementarity Role Frustration Role Poverty Role Saturation
Terrorism	Community	Social Institutions: Family Economy Education Religion Polity	System Disorder: {anomie}

Note: Adapted from Bates and Harvey (1976; cf., Austin, 1989; 1999; Nix and Bates, 1962).

Varieties of styles of role stress apply, as noted in Figure 1, and deserve further clarification.

Role Conflict:

Following the conceptual scheme of F. L. Bates (1975), role conflict pertains to contradictory cultural norms held be a single actor in regards to how a function should be accomplished. Culture is defined as containing all the norms, values, customs, and laws of the research setting. Subsequently, it is entirely predictable that individuals will become conflicted with many persons holding mixed sentiments in regards to how to react to the act of violence and destruction or on-going fear brought on by periodic rebel extremism (i.e., a human "disaster" in the form of violence). It was common for a respondent in the research setting to feel anger and to support vengeance, but at the same time to uphold the very Christian ideal of "turning the cheek." "How can you hold the rosary beads in one hand and a weapon in the other" responded one local? This conflict is not new. It is seen in the position held by conscientious objectors who define war and the potential of taking of life to be contrary to their religious principles. In the research setting, there are varying degrees of such role conflict. Some may do absolutely nothing about living in a terror-prone area. They do not keep weapons and are not prepared to fight if confronted by rebel extremists. Others may lock their doors and shelter themselves and keep watch through partially closed shutters, even though not really prepared to offer resistance. Others keep weapons on hand and are prepared to fight, but at the same time view themselves as devout Christians. And, others may join counter-terrorist groups.

Role Incongruity:

This style of role stress is similar to the previous role conflict in that it also refers to a single actor experiencing stress within his or her own culture. However, in this case, the stress

results because of "status inconsistencies" in how functions are performed. For example, in times of disaster, natural or otherwise, a high-status person may have to rely upon a low-status person to provide life-saving assistance. In the turmoil following a disaster, or in preparation for such disasters, one's social status may be pushed aside in order for specialized functions to be carried out. Just as in war, a low-ranking sergeant may have to take over the duties of an officer or vice-versa. Or, a non-medically trained citizen may be thrust into a position of offering emergency health care. It was very common at the research site for lowly educated individuals, perhaps out of work or high school dropouts, to be the persons to take on the tasks of countering rebel extremist activity. One worry was that rebel groups might squat on one's land. It regularly would befall the low-status, uneducated individual (i.e., rather than the official police) to take-up arms to try to repel the land squatters. Taking on the role of law-enforcement puts the average citizen in a position that is "out of sync" with the demands of their usual culture and role expectations.

Given the tradition of informal local control as provided by the neighborhood security force, this is somewhat of a grey area. *Tanod* members do have some official capacity, but often even average citizens will take part in attempts to subdue outside extremists. In this case, it is observed that some stress will be experienced. In one case reported to the researcher, a father and his four sons went to a part of their land where a squatter had set up household. With guns in hand, they approach the house when the squatter was not present and dismantled part of the house, making it unlivable. This was a very uneasy time for the armed family because they did not know what to expect or how the squatter would react when they returned. In the rebel infested area, the attitude for some was to "shoot first and worry about any explanation later."

Role Inadequacy:

This type of stress occurs when a person does not possess the personality attributes in order to carry out a prescribed set of role expectations. Thus, this is a mismatch between one's personality and the cultural roles assigned, or that might befall, a person. This type of a mismatch between culture and personality is quite common and perhaps even more common than "role incongruity" that pertained to status inequities. Many do not hold the correct personality or dispositions to smoothly perform certain functions. As suggested earlier, citizens taking over the role of police or soldier are for some quite incompatible, not only as "status" disparity but here, in the case of role-inadequacy, personality is simply not a good fit. Not everyone has the right mental disposition to join the Marine Corps, or for that matter, to become a classroom teacher. For this reason, it appears that some citizens simply do not feel comfortable leaving the security of their homes, particularly at night, if there is a chance of encountering rebel, extremists groups believed to be in the area. This "inadequacy" might be looked upon as simply a matter of how one feels about their own personal security. In this case, however, it more strictly pertains to the either inherent or acquired disposition of confidence, poise or coolness when confronting head-on with unexpected circumstances and danger. The example of a fire-fighter during a disaster, natural or otherwise, is perhaps a good example of one expected to hold a good fit between cultural role expectations and personality.

Role Non-complementarity (i.e., sometimes referred to as role non-reciprocity):

Roles are usually performed in complementary pairs. That is a teaching function or role requires the existence of a student. The same applies with most occupations (i.e., merchants, bankers, grocers, lawyers, etc.). In role non-complementarity cases, the conflict involves two

different actors who are at odds with each other and, therefore, do not interact. Disasters of any sort may clearly disrupt the smooth carrying-out of a person's specialized functions. Both ego and alter must be present, or interact, in order for the function to be carried out. These scenarios are noticeably evident in mixed-ethnic communities and clearly at the research site with intermixed Muslim and Christian populations. It has become clear in Lanao del Norte that some disputes will not be taken to a town court for resolution because of an expectation that the court will be biased for or against a client who happens to be Christian or Muslim. One occasionally hears the comment: "That judge is a Muslim so do not bother to take your case to court." Muslim-Christian disputes can go on for years never to be settled, unless by bloodshed. Some Christian residents will not enter into a shopping district if it is heavily operated by Muslim merchants, or vice-versa.

Interestingly, at the research site, a new occupational role has emerged whereby an individual keeps one foot in both cultures. Some persons, perhaps through intermarriage, maintain connections with both cultures (i.e., becoming accepting of both Muslim and Christian traditions or *mestizo*) and act as a "go-between" to try to work out an amicable settlement (Austin, 2008; 2012).[4]

Role non-complementarity includes situations of discrimination (racial or otherwise). Stress may result because there is no other person willing to accept or respond to the opposing individual's specialized function so that a role can be enacted or performed. For instance, a local Christian resident in research setting may feel that their behavior is appropriate. However, they also feel that another's behavior (i.e., Muslim extremist) is of a different and "lower" socio-cultural station of life. Rag-tag mercenaries are seen as uncultivated, low-status, un-shaven, insurgents compared to their own definitions of self that are viewed as more refined and

accepting of the regulations and laws, and viewed as Christianly. Of course, the opposite is true whereby the Muslim rebels view the Christians as infidels, unclean (i.e., pork eaters or "*kafir*"), and unaccepting of Muslim traditions and law (i.e., *sharia* law).

Role Frustration:

Simply stated, all behavior and cultural roles must be performed on a stage. There must be specific objects and conditions that exist to form a situational context or backdrop for the function or role to be enacted. If a teacher has no chalk, or the electricity goes out, it may be impossible for the role to be implemented. Rather obviously, this would lead to frustration of the classroom instructor. Every occupation will apply. Farmers need rain, carpenters need tools, bakers need flower and sugar, etc., etc. Clearly, natural disasters will cause immediate disruption to the situational environment making it difficult or impossible for the cultural roles to be accomplished.

At the research site, and depending on the intensity of rebel activity, various styles of role frustration could be detected. Perhaps, a best example is seen in the presence of periodic road blocks set up by police or military as checkpoints. The problem was that it became known that extremists might also set up a make-shift checkpoint to stop travelers for potential highway thievery or personal violence. Locals were always suspicious when approaching roadside checkpoints and would only slow down at first upon approaching with foot on the gas pedal ready to speed away should it be decided the checkpoint was fraudulent. The point is that the road blocks impeded the performance of cultural roles even if simply getting to work.

Other instances of role-frustration were evident when, for example, local rice farmers were unable to attend to their crops because of rebel activity in the area. Likely in the majority of cases, local farmers would ignore any rebel activity and go about their chores as a daily

routine. However, in another circumstance, a local school was closed for the day because recurrent gunfire could be heard in the distance. Also, rather obviously, should a bomb be detonated in a downtown shopping district, as did occur during the time period of this field work, the stage on which many roles are performed is instantly disrupted and personal stress is at its highest.

Role Poverty:

Role poverty refers to a condition whereby an individual has too few roles to perform and suffers boredom or a state of dullness. It is likely impossible to reach a state of absolute role poverty because even an individual who is sleeping or sitting under a tree is doing something. Yet, some conditions such as the onset of disasters may cut one off from their normal cultural activities. Or, they are simply unable to perform a number of their expected routine daily functions as, for instance, they might pertain to social institutions (e.g., familial, economical, educational, political, etc.). This style of stress is similar to or perhaps an extension of the previously discussed role-frustration. However, role poverty would generally be viewed as more permanent or long-lasting compared to a more temporary role-frustration situation. Stress emerging out of role-poverty would have varying degrees and it would be unusual for one to be completely cut off from their daily routine activities. At the inception of a disaster such as when a hurricane first hits shore or when a terrorist bomb explodes in a public place, it is clear that one would be unable to perform the expected cultural functions. More likely, multiple routine roles would be disrupted, and perhaps only to be replaced by others.

In regards to role poverty, three points need to be made. First, as mentioned earlier, many citizens of the research setting already suffer from role-poverty given their condition of labor deficiency or economic poverty with either unemployment or underemployment. This is

somewhat of a demographic dilemma with overpopulation leading to a lack of available resources (i.e., food and water, lack of jobs, etc.). Rather obviously, those in severe economic poverty would noticeably suffer less role-poverty than the successfully working merchant, banker, or physician. Also, those in economic poverty simply have less to lose during times of disaster, terrorism or otherwise. In this sense, those already in economic poverty would suffer less stress during times of disaster.

Second, in an on-going terror-prone region such as the research setting, it is true than social mobility is reduced. People are at times afraid to walk the streets. As a researcher, I was continuously warned to not walk to town or even down the street to the local marketplace for fear that I might be apprehended by rebels. Kidnapping did occasionally occur and was on the minds of many locals that resulted in a continuous state of fear or apprehension. Thus, as social mobility is reduced, one is less able to carry out routine functions or roles of daily life adding to the role-poverty condition.

Third, a setting characterized by unemployed or underemployed persons, sets the stage for rebel groups eager to find a ready clientele for recruitment into rebel ranks. Those who are already in economic despair would rather understandably be targeted for luring into extremist rebel enterprises. This is a logical possibility but the extent of such recruitment activity has not been carefully studied in the research area.

Subsequently, the relevance of role-poverty in a terror-prone region is more complex than first meets the eye. However, the main common-sense point to be made here is that living in a terror-prone setting, and surely during terrorist activity such as violence and property destruction, reduces one's ability to carry out daily cultural functions and will lead to role-poverty and stress.

<u>Role Saturation:</u>

Role saturation, sometimes referred to as role-superfluity, is the opposite of role poverty. At times, and predictably during the on-set of disasters, one may find themselves in a position whereby role-expectations are greater than can be achieved or fulfilled by the actor. During the World-Trade Center bombings in 2001, it is clear that many were in a state of panic because they had to carry-out multiple functions that perhaps they were not prepared for. That is an extreme case. But, even at the research site, with on-going fear of uprisings, and an occasional terrorist event, some community members were forced into numerous roles for which they were not adequately prepared. Role stress arising out of a saturation of functions appears to be uncommon at the research site. This stress would predictably emerge during an actual terrorism event when, for instance, some citizens are forced into providing assistance in a variety of unfamiliar activities. This style of role-stress may be seen somewhat as an extension of role incongruity or role-frustration. As with role-poverty, role-saturation is more extensive and perhaps long-lasting.

Some of these seven styles of role stress can viewed as overlapping or, perhaps one style morphing into another. As suggested, it may be difficult to conceptualize role poverty and saturation without first explaining several of the other specific styles of stress. As outlined in Figure 1, the various role stresses can be seen to impact at individual, group, and community level. The point is a rather simple one. To the extent that individuals are suffering stress, one must presume that the community or society will reflect also varying levels of discord. The sociological concept of anomie does appear to apply. That is, being unable to fulfill one's specific roles, and as this multiplies to significant portions of the population, we must assume

that the citizenry will exhibit a certain amount of confusion. An anomic society is one that reflects diverse kinds of confusion or misunderstandings. This can be due to confusion as to the meaning of a particular rule or custom. How is one supposed to behavior in a terrorist-prone region? What are the cultural expectations? Also, people may be confused due to a mixture or saturation of rules. In a time of societal chaos, routine regulations of everyday life are in turmoil. Finally, an anomic society would suggest that due to on-going turmoil, citizenry are unable to find a path toward upward mobility (Mutchnick, Martin, and Austin, 2009). In a true sociological or Durkheimian sense, a region of political turmoil such as a terror-prone region of the research setting fits all the qualities necessary for an anomic society (For instance, Merton, 1949; cf., Kubrin, Stucky, and Krohn, 2009).

Response to research question 4: ***How have local citizens found ways to cope with life in the conflict-ridden research setting*?** Or, in other words, what styles or modes of adaptation have emerged in this troubled region?

In a sense, as outlined in the previous section, role stress occupies the lives of locals of the research setting and also addresses how citizens cope with their problems. Yet, research question 4 goes a bit farther in scope. What are the various ways that locals respond to life in the research setting, whether stressed out or not? Stated differently, being stressed-out is somewhat involuntary. One has relatively little control over whether or not they are going to suffer role stress when confronted with disasters. Now we are concerned with the next step—what is the voluntary or purposeful reaction of local citizens to life in the terror-prone land.

The reader should be reminded that this study does not provide survey styled data that would furnish a more statistical response to this research question. At this point, an answer to this last research question is limited to conceptual responses. Based on direct, personal contact

with local citizenry, a number of conceptual models (i.e., empirical generalizations) are presented that can form the basis for more quantitative, survey styled data collection.

As portrayed in Table 2, four different types of responses to life in the terror-prone province of Lanao del Norte were uncovered. The four types are also shown to be aligned with two levels of interactive involvement. These are "integrative" participants (i.e., those who are likely to to join groups), and "segregated" bystanders (i.e., those who are inclined to isolate themselves and tend to not become joiners). Also, each of the four types of responses is shown to be either dedicated or non-dedicated in their level of motivation or enthusiasm to take part in any organized response against terrorism.

Table 2. Individual Adaptations to Terrorism with Related Levels of Group Involvement

Group Involvement	Dedicated	Non-dedicated
Integrated {Participants}	Type I *Organizational Devotee*	Type II *Timid Affiliate*
Segregated {Bystanders}	Type III *Lone Crusader*	Type IV *Habitué*

Note: Adapted from Austin, 1989.

Table 3 extends the discussion by suggesting the level of anxiety of citizen involvement (i.e., low, medium, or high) of the four types of adaptation to terrorism with a brief descriptor of the nature of citizen reaction (i.e., Vengeful; Resentful-Apprehensive; Aware-Concealed; and Oblivious/Habituated). Each of the four types of citizen response to terrorism merits further clarification.

Table 3. Style and Level of Stress of Citizen Reaction to Terrorism

_____

	Stress Level		
Response Style	High	Medium	Low
Type I {*Vengeful*}	√		
Type II {*Resentful/Apprehensive*}		√	
Type III {*Spiteful/Concealed*}	√		
Type IV {*Oblivious/Habituated*}			√

Type I: The Organizational Devotee (*Vengeful*)

At the research site, it became clear that a segment of the citizenry anxiously join various

organizations whose mission it is to actively counter the rebel extremists associated with terrorist

activity. Type I responses generally fall into three sub-categories: military, police, or local

barangay-level informal security groups. Clearly, the organizational devotees have openly taken

a stance against Muslim extremists and are categorized here as vengeful. These individuals

become the willing participants in the counter-terrorism organizations, and must be characterized

as high in anxiety level as depicted in Table 3. However, when discussing the motivation for

taking part in the various law-enforcement organizations, it was brought to my attention that

some citizens join the counter-terrorist organizations in order to acquire modern, high-powered

weapons. Such weaponry is out-of-reach of the masses of the underemployed citizens.

The implication here is that for some, after receiving the weapons, they depart the organizations and disappear into the rural villages and the countryside. In other extreme cases, it was reported that a few will join the military or police groups in order to specifically seek revenge against a long-time personal or family antagonist that at an earlier date, even years earlier, was in an unsolved dispute with the organizational devotee. As part of the military or police, the dispute or feud could potentially be settled with the indirect support of the organization. It was unknown how many such cases of unresolved disputes (i.e., often involving Muslim-Christian feuds) existed, only that this was a real issue known to persist in the area. Still, these are undoubtedly a minority of the organizational devotees, the great majority of whom are predicted here to remain dedicated as shown in Table 2. It should be pointed out that, in fact, some Muslim citizens may also join military or police organizations. However, at the research site the perception is clearly that Islamic groups who see Christians as infidels are more often than not the rebel antagonists.

Type II: The Timid Affiliate (*Resentful-Apprehensive*)

The Timid Affiliate is also a joiner and highly integrated into the community. These individuals, whether male or female, become more active in civic groups and organizations where they can interact with other local citizens (i.e., often community leaders) and engage in conversations about their feelings regarding the periodic Muslim-Christian uprisings in the province. These persons do not carry weapons although some were known to have access to weapons in their homes. Basically, as the label for this response type implies, these citizens tend to be more timid, perhaps fearful, and leave any overt counter-terror action to Type I responders.

As a field researcher, I was introduced to many of the "timid-affiliates" at local men's organizations (i.e., Rotary International; church groups, social gatherings, etc.) where I was

invited, sometimes as a reluctant guest speaker. As suggested, this type of citizen often comprises community leaders and frequently those of the more privileged social class (i.e., town mayors, physicians, judges, lawyers, educators, and journalists, to name a few). Type II representatives are well-read, and can be seen consistently purchasing without fail several of the numerous daily newspapers. They are very knowledgeable of local and national politics, and of the ever present Muslim-Christian unrest, but, unlike Type I citizens, always tend to keep their distance active counter-terrorist involvement.

As shown in Table II, the Timid Affiliate is characterized as "resentful" of the Muslim-Christian turmoil, yet "apprehensive" about taking any active part. Their anxiety level is assessed as "medium" contrasted to the "high" anxiety level given Type I citizenry. Also, both Type I and Type II individuals tend to be opinionated but with the "organizational devotee" showing more of an emotional or angry reaction of the Muslim-Christian conflict. Not surprisingly, the "timid affiliate" shows more of a reasoned or analytical approach to life in the research setting.. For instance, long conversations with local educators would result in receiving a history lesson on Muslim-Christian relations in the Southern Philippines.

Type III: The Lone Crusader (*Aware-Concealed*)

Type III individuals are admittedly presented here somewhat as a logical possibility and very few, perhaps only several, interviewees would fit this category. Here we have the lone individual who rather secretly carries out his or her own personal vendetta against what they see as problematical Muslim fanatics. One rather harmless elderly woman would collect as many local and national newspapers as she could, and clip any article that portrayed Islam in a negative way. She would invariably hold a handful of these negative clippings and any visitor to her house would be enticed to take the clippings to read and pass along to others. As depicted in

Table 2 and Table 3, the "lone crusader" remains segregated from most of the community and are not joiners, as are Type I and II citizens. The "lone crusader" is further described as spiteful of what is going on in the terror-prone province, while remaining concealed or hidden from view. Logically, one might expect Type III persons to include such extreme cases as portrayed by the celebrated, behind-the-scenes "Unabomber" who covertly sent explosive devices through the mail to persons or groups he perceived as enemies. No such case emerged in the research setting. The Type III "lone crusader" is given a rating of "high" for level of anxiety about life in a terror-prone region.

Type IV: The Habitué (*Oblivious*)

Although somewhat surprising, the most common style of citizen reaction to terrorism is likely the Type IV "Habitué." Here we have the great bulk of the population who remain relatively segregated from society and who live out their lives in the hundreds of isolated villages. Two kinds of the "Habitué" emerge. First is the isolated individual who "purposely" choses to remain uninvolved in any socio-political activity even though they may have heard of rebel activity from their co-workers. They will not watch television news and will not read a newspaper. Many overhear gunfire in the distance, but chose to not involve themselves. They are content to remain non-dedicated to anything other than their own routine life. For many, this means working in the rice fields, far from any organized government activity. Many of these isolated villagers hold strict Catholic traditions and are content to lead the simple, pastoral life while leaving their destiny in the hands of their deity. Interestingly, some city folk also fit this category.

A second type (or sub-type) of the "Habitué" is the local resident who simply becomes so accustomed to the tumultuous life in the province that they literally become "habituated" to the

turmoil? These are predictably the farm workers who have become so conditioned with socio-political or religious conflict that they no longer hear the distant gunfire, and become totally acclimated and oblivious to what may be going on in the distance.

It is likely that persons fitting the "Habitué" type reside in regions close to Muslim-Christian turmoil. Those living with relatively continuous fear of uprisings would likely lead to the "tuning-out" of the problem more so than those who reside in areas of infrequent conflict.[5] It should be recalled that Mindanao is about the size of Ohio, and the Muslim-Christian conflict varies substantially from one province to another. Reasons that one province would see more conflict than another in Mindanao has not been systematically examined.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

As noted in earlier pages, this report does not attempt to bring statistical clarity to the different styles of responses to terrorism by citizenry of Lanao del Norte. Rather, this paper provides a number of conceptual models for what emerged from conversations with locals and after living in the research setting on a number of occasions. One way to conceptualize the variety of citizen responses to terrorism is to contrast the official government actions to terrorism with responses at the local, neighborhood levels as suggested in Table 4.

At the national level, the Philippine government has attempted to resolve the terrorist activity, particularly that found in Mindanao, for generations. The efforts have gained few lasting benefits. It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve deeply into the various government struggles. Many important discussions are available (Aquino, III, 2012, c.f.: Collier, 2006; Ferrer, 2005; Hoffman, 2002; Santos, 2010). Yet, a few comments are in order.

Table 4. Adaptive Models to Terrorism in Lanao del Norte (Philippines) by Level of Engagement of Each Response Type and by the Response Source

Adaptive Response Source	Engagement Level		
	High	Moderate	Low {i.e., Passivity}
Government {Formal}	Type I {Organizational devotee}		
Local {Informal}	Type III {Lone Crusader}	Type II {Timid Affiliate}	Type IV Habitué

The response at the national government level against terrorist activity includes military and police actions whose efforts to counter the rebel organizations have made parts of Mindanao appear to be a war zone, particularly with numerous check points blocking roadways.

Over past decades, the government has initiated numerous peace agreements with the Mindanao Muslim populations. The various agreements have all had a rather unsteady history. It is not a mistake if outsiders see the Mindanao dilemma of Muslim-Christian conflict as analogous to the Israeli-Palestine attempt to arrive at a road-map that carves out a homeland for both disputing parties.   In Mindanao, the quest for Muslim autonomous land in Mindanao included the setting aside of a portion of Islamic dominate (i.e., five provinces that sporadically included and/or excluded a number of few cities and towns) into what was officially termed the "Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao" or the "ARMM." The ARMM had its own representation in the nation's capital and received a portion of national tax revenues, was given official sanction in the late 1980s under then President Corazon Aquino (Arguillas, 2012).

Visitors to Mindanao from the United States, and to this researcher, logically see the ARMM solution as similar to the creation of reservation life for the indigenous Native American populations in the 19th century. Theoretically, having a "reservation" or ARMM homeland may make some sense. That is, American Indians and the Mindanao Muslims are provided a specific territory where they can maintain a sense of political and cultural autonomy. However, outside the secluded ARMM remained substantial "non-Muslim" populations, and outside the Indian reservations remained dominate and primarily Caucasian populations. Not surprisingly, both the ARMM and the Indian reservations suffered negative stereotyping from outsiders. Also problematic is that the ARMM was decided by ballot, and it was never a

unanimous decision. Some Muslim citizens voted against the ARMM, but a majority of positive votes led to its enactment. Furthermore, some non-Muslim populations reside within the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao. Moreover, most peculiar to the ARMM, was that the provinces that voted to be a part of the autonomous region were not in all cases contiguous, and also included several city populations that voted to not be included in the ARMM. Consequently, the autonomous territory assumed a Swiss-cheese appearance.

From hindsight, it would appear that such an arrangement was destined to fail. It satisfied only a portion of the Muslim populations, many of whom would still held anger against the politically dominate Christians that extended back hundreds of years. And, of course, the Philippine Christians, at 85 to 90 percent majority in the nation, hold authority in congress, and the purse strings.   Again, from a theoretical perspective, it can be argued that for the Muslims "something is better than nothing." Yet, Islamic extremists continued with periodic uprisings— just enough to keep Mindanao in the news as a terror-prone region.

Over the past few years, the ARMM experiment has given way to a more refined model of autonomy referred to as "*Bangsamoro*" (literally "Moro Nation"). With this refined model, select provinces of Mindanao would be given some self-rule with the provision that rebel activity would cease and that the national government would abstain its military quest to overthrow the Muslim dissident organizations.

As this research was on-going in the summer of 2014, the agreements for "*Bangsamoro*" were signed by all parties (i.e., Muslim extremist organizations and the Philippine government) to be implemented in 2016. Nonetheless, it is most likely that were a survey to be administered of the Mindanao citizenry, the new plan would predictably not be given much hope for success, given the many generations of failed agreements throughout five presidential regimes. The new

autonomous plan retains the Swiss-cheese character and the similar mixture of Muslim and Christian populations as the earlier ARMM. In Mindanao, the *Bangsamoro* includes five provinces, two cities, six towns, and six barangays (Arguillas, 2012). Yet, even with these negative comments, the *Bangsamoro* plan, flaws and all, does represent a formal model for peace as reflected in Table 4 as a "Type I" response.

Table's 3 and 4 also reflect other responses in the research setting (i.e., Type's II, III, & IV). Whereas government military and police intervention as a model for peace is most formal (i.e., governmental), and at a high engagement level, other responses such as the "Lone Crusader" (Type II) and the "Timid Affiliates" (Type III) are outside government at the local level. Although the "Lone Affiliate" may, indeed, represent high levels of engagement, they operate behind the scenes and generally hidden from view. The "Timid Affiliates" are the joiners of local civic, non-governmental, organizations. They can be quite vocal but do not commonly hold a public stage to reach large populations. Operating primarily in small groups, they are assessed as "moderately" engaged in their response or reaction to terrorism.

Type IV individuals (Habitué) are noted as representing the bulk of the population of the research setting. They include those who choose to not be concerned as well as those isolated individuals who are totally oblivious or habituated to any conflict of the area. Because it is argued here that the majority of persons of the province are Type IV "Habitué," in their response, or lack of response, most citizens of the research setting do not walk the streets with constant fear of terrorism.

We must again return to the analogy between terrorism and natural disasters. The monsoons and floods are going to periodically occur; such is life in the Philippine islands. Likewise, after nearly 500 years, disputes between Islam and Christianity also periodically

intensify. For most, this has become life as usual in Lanao del Norte along the northwest coast of Mindanao.

The larger issues, and those that indirectly underscore terrorism, include some of the sociocultural features that characterize the research setting as portrayed in Figure I. In the Philippines, population levels have far exceeded available resources leaving many without work or underemployed. The infra-structure of the islands (i.e., and the research setting), especially regarding transportation and communication, remains problematic, and the nation continues to maintain a "non-compulsory" stance toward public education. These fundamental features have an indirect relationship to how citizenry respond to disasters—natural and human. Attention to them begs to be given higher priority.

LIMITATIONS

The title of this report, and of the original small grant from IPRAF, reflect an ambitious undertaking—undoubtedly of one biting off more than one can chew. The commentary pertaining to the four research questions are admittedly brief. And, the discussions are limited to a single province in Mindanao. Lanao del Norte represents a mixture of Muslim and Christian citizenry, but it may well be true that a similar study conducted farther south in Mindanao would reflect somewhat different findings. Some may understandably argue that Lanao del Norte is only on the edge of the conflict between Muslim and Christian populations. This highlights the need for replication of this study. Additionally, this study discusses the structure of role stress that appears to be associated with routine life in the research setting as an approach to understanding how locals are adapting in a terror-prone land. This may not be a good fit with the discussion of formal, governmental adaptations to Muslim-Christian conflict.

ENDNOTES

1. It was always surprising that local workers in Manila who had spent most, if not all, of their life in the capital city in the Northern Philippines would be the persons who were startled that an American would visit Mindanao. Locals working in Manila (i.e., taxi drivers) who were often from the Southern islands were less surprised. Those who had lived in Mindanao knew that the reputation of the southern island was often exaggerated.

2. It was the exiled President Marcos who in 1978, through presidential decree, officially changed the name of "barrio" to the ancient term of "*barangay*." Today, all citizens reside in a barangay whether rural or urban. This mandated a political boundary on all villages and urban sub-divisions or neighborhoods. Because each *barangay* has a rudimentary elected political system, it does act as a most local and somewhat quasi-formal system of social order (Silliman, 1991, cf. Austin, 1984). Rather ironical, the *barangay* is further subdivided into even smaller divisions referred to as "*puroks*" that also have an even more rudimentary elected political structure (See, for example, Silliman, 1993; cf.: Austin, 1984.

3. Intermarriage between Muslims and Christians in the Philippines may turn out to be the long-range and unexpected solution to the prolonged ethnic conflict. Although such intermarriages are discussed in many religiously oriented documents regarding when such can occur, there are very few systematic studies available on the actual structure and function of such intermarriages or their impact on the larger society (Luis Lacar, 1987, 1988, provides a few rare examples).

4. The Filipino men I met at the research site who were considered Muslim-Christian mestizos did not appear to suffer from discrimination from either their Muslim or Christian backgrounds. One male informant, upon rejecting his Islamic heritage and marrying a Christian woman, was

still able to come and go into Muslim communities and acted as an arbiter in disputes without apparent difficulty.

5. There is a quote toward the end of the movie *Jeremiah Johnson* (1972) when the character Bear Claw (played by Will Geer) asks Jeremiah Johnson (played by Robert Redford) how he is fairing with the American Indian problem that he had been confronting with continuous skirmishes for years. In one of the more poignant scenes in the movie,…Jeremiah Johnson thinks for a moment and replies "what problem"?

REFERENCES

Aquino, III, Benigno S. 2013. Speech of President Aquino on the Framework Agreement with

the MILF (On the *Bangsamoro*). Office of the President of the Philippines. Manila.

(www.opapp.gov.ph).

Arguillas, Carolyn O. 2012. From RAG to ARMM to Bangsamoro: Salamat Hashim Would

Have Approved of Bangsamoro's Proposed Territory. Cagayan de Oro, Mindanao: *Minda*

News. (October, 11).

Austin, Timothy. 1984. Conceptual confusion among rural Filipinos in adapting to modern

procedures of amicable settlement. *International Journal of Comparative and Applied*

Criminal Justice. 11 (2):241-250.

Austin, Timothy. 1988. Field notes on the vigilante movement in Mindanao: A mix of self-help

and formal policing networks. *International Journal of Comparative and Applied*

Criminal Justice.   12 (2): 205-217.

Austin, Timothy. 1989. Living on the edge: The impact of terrorism upon Philippine villagers.

International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology. 33 (1):103-

119.

Austin, Timothy. 1991. Toward a theory on the impact of terrorism: The Philippine scenario.

International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice. 15 (1): 33-48.

Austin, Timothy. 1995. Filipino self-help and peacemaking strategies: A view from the

Mindanao hinterland. *Human Organization*. 54 (1): 10-19.

Austin, Timothy. 1999. *Banana Justice: Field Notes on Philippine Crime and Custom*. Westport,

Connecticut: Praeger.

Austin, Timothy. 2008. Coping with payola: Field ventures from Mindanao. *Human Organization.* 67 (2): 173-180.

Austin, Timothy. 2012. Takers keepers, losers weepers: Theft as customary play in the Southern Philippines. *Journal of Folklore Research.* 49 (3): 347-369.

Bates, F. L. and Harvey, C. 1976 (1986). The *Structure of Social Systems.* New York: Gardner Press.

Bates, F.L., Fogleman, C. W., Parenton, V. J., Pittman, R. H., Tracy, G. S. 1963. *The Social and Psychological Consequences of a natural Disaster: A Longitudinal Study of Hurricane Audrey.* Washington, D. C.: Disaster Research Group (Disaster Study Number 18): National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council (Publication 1081).

Bates, F.L. and Peacock, W.G. 1987. Disasters and Social Change. In, R. R. Dynes and C. Pelanda (Eds.) *Sociology of Disasters.* Gorizia, Italy: Franco Angeli.

Berg, Bruce. 1989. *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences.* Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Biddle, J. and Thomas, E. J., 1966. *Role Theory: Concepts and Research.* New York: Wiley.

Camba, A. A. 2012. Religion, disaster, and colonial power in the Spanish Philippines in the sixteeth to seventeenth centuries. *Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture.* 6:215-231.

Carr, L. J. 1932. Disaster and the sequence-pattern concept of social change. *American Journal of Sociology.* 38: 207-218.

Che Man, W. K. 1990. *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand.* Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Collier, K. 2006. Terrorism: Evolving regional alliances and state failure in Mindanao. In D. Singh and L. C. Salazar. (EDs.). *Southeast Asian Affairs*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Ferrer, M. C. 2005. The Philippine state and Moro resistance: Dynamics of a persistent conflict. In: K. Askandar and A. Abubakar, (Eds.) *The Mindanao Conflict*. Penang: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network.

Gibbs, Jack P. 1989. Conceptualization of terrorism. *American Sociological Review*. 54 (June): 329-340.

Gowing, Peter G. 1988. *Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines*. Quezon City, Philippines: New Day Publishers.

Greisman, Harvey. 1977. Social meaning of terrorism: Reification, violence and social control. *Contemporary Crisis*. July: 303318.

Hoffman, B. 2002. The new terrorism. In: A. T. H. Tan and K. Ramakrishna, (Eds.). *The New Terrorism: Anatomy Rends and Counter-Strategies*. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press.

Klare, M.T., Kornbluh, P., 1988. *Low-intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Kubrin, Charis E., Stucky, Thomas D., and Krohn, Marvin D. *Researching Theories of Crime and Deviance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lacar, Luis. 1987. Neglected dimensions in the development of Filipino Muslims *Solidarity*. 113 (July-August): 8-16.

Lacar, Luis. 1988. Neglected dimensions in the development of Muslim Mindanao and the continuing struggle of the Moro people for self-determination. *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs.* 9 (2) July.

Loftland, John, Snow, David, Anderson, Leon, Lofland, Lyn. 2006. *Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observations and Analysis* (4th Edition). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomas Learning.

Machado, K. G. 1979. Politics and dispute processing in the rural Philippines. *Pacific Affairs*. 52: 294-314.

Marx, K. 1844 (Reprinted 1975). *The Collected Works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Merton, Robert. 1949. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: The Free Press.

Morgan, David. 1993. *Successful Focus Groups: Advancing the State of the Art*. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage.

Mutchnick, R. J., Martin, R., and Austin, T. *Criminological Theory: Pioneers Past and Present*. Upper Saddle River, N. J.: Prentice Hall.

National Statistics Office. 2010. *Census of Population and Housing for Lanao del Norte, Philippines*.

Nix, H. L. and Bates, F.L. Occupational role stresses: A structural approach. *Rural Sociology*. 27: 7-17.

Quickstat. 2014. *A Monthly Update of National Statistics Office's Most Frequently Requested Statistics*. Manila: National Statistics office.

Rodriguez, H., Quarantelli, E., and Dynes, R. 2007. *Handbook of Disaster Research*. New York: Springer.

Santos, Soliman M. 1010. Counter-terrorism and peace negotiations with Philippine rebel groups. *Critical Studies on Terrorism.* 3 (1):137-154.

Shultz, Richard H., 1991. The low-intensity conflict environment of the 1990s. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. 517 (1): 120-134.

Silliman, G. S. 1991. A political analysis of the Philippines' katarungang pambarangay system of informal justice through mediation. *Law & Society Review*. 19 (2): 279-301.

Simmons, C. H., and Mitch, J. R. 1985. Labelling public aggression: When is it terrorism? *Journal of Social Psychology*. 125 (2): 245-251.

Sorokin, P., Zimmerman, C. and Galpin, C. 1930. *A Systematic Sourcebook in Rural Sociology*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Stoddard, E. R. 1968. *Conceptual Models of Human Behavior in Disaster*. The University of Texas at El Paso: Texas Western Press.

Terrorism in the Philippines. 2013. Wikipedia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism_in_the_Philippines

Terrorist Organizations in the Philippines. 2013. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism. (START). (A Center for Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security). College Park: University of Maryland.

Time, Victoria. 2013. Lessons learned about low crime rates in Japan: Field notes from interviews with Japanese police officers. In: Mackey, David A and Levan, Kristine (Eds). *Crime Prevention.* Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning.

Turk, Austin T. 1976. Law as a weapon in social conflict. *Social Problems*. 23 (3):276-291.

Vinck, P. and Bell, E. 2011. *Violent Conflicts and Displacement in Central Mindanao:*

Challenges for Recovery and Development. The World Bank Group. Washington, D.C.

Walter, Eugene V. 1964. Violence and the process of terror. *American Sociological Review*. 29:

(April) 248-257.